

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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INFORMATION REPORT

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The Federation of Yugoslav Communists - Old Wounds and Current Difficulties

1. Most of the pre-World War II members of the Federation of Yugoslav Communists (FCY), formerly the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY), have been removed from the important Party and governmental posts. Their removal can be attributed to the fact that prior to World War II several factions existed within the Party resulting in many internal struggles. The sharpest struggle took place at the time of Tito's election to the post of Secretary-General of the Party. Most of the Party's intellectuals energetically opposed his election, and he reciprocated by refusing to recognize them as members of the Party.

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
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2. Another group in the Party which found itself in opposition to Tito was composed of "old-time communists". They found it impossible to adapt themselves to Tito's policies because they viewed them as deviating from orthodox communist doctrine. Many of them were deprived of important posts because they failed to join or duly collaborate with Tito's liberation army. 

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3.

"old-time communists" present a continuous threat to the Tito regime because they cannot logically be accused of Cominformism or of ignoring Party discipline. Tito could not liquidate them by indulging in a classical communist purge because they were actually the only real communist idealists in the Party. The bulk of those who entered the Party during or after the last war are mostly opportunists or people compromised by war crimes who can find protection only in the present regime.

4. Tito and his lieutenants are aware of the enormous moral influence of these "old-time communists" and their value in the eyes of foreign communist organizations. Consequently, all possible attempts are made by Tito and his regime to keep the old-timers in the Party and to neutralize their influence by not giving them any important positions in the Party organization. By these tactics Tito hopes to prevent or diminish the danger of the old-timers' joining the Cominform.
5. However, with respect to Yugoslav relations with the West, Tito and his "old-time communists" find themselves in agreement. Neither faction cares to join the West because by adopting the requirements of the Western world for more personal and political freedom in Yugoslavia, they would automatically lose their respective positions.
6. Although it is difficult to define specific factions within the leadership of the FCY, there are various groups within the Party hierarchy with different orientations. It is generally known that the top-level communists distrust each other because they fear that certain members of their own restricted circle are Soviet penetrations or secretly pro-Cominform. As an illustration of this distrust, since 1948 it has been noted that in their private conversations among themselves or with Yugoslav nationalists they never criticized the USSR or the Cominform. Neither did they express a favorable opinion of the Kremlin's policies. Until the death of Stalin, however, both the Cominform and the USSR were very strongly attacked during all public meetings of the Party and in the press and radio. From the time of Stalin's death until September 1953, attacks against the Orbit were much milder and less frequent. In September 1953, these diatribes ceased entirely.
7. Another indication of the degree of distrust among the leaders of the Party is the fact that whenever international developments take a turn for the worse, outstanding communists seek contact with well-known nationalists. This practice is so universal and obvious that it has been the subject of serious discussion among nationalist intellectuals. It was initially thought that these approaches were merely a matter of determining the views and reactions of non-communist nationalists to specific international events. This, however, proved erroneous, for it was soon determined that many outstanding communists made efforts to convince their nationalist acquaintances of their sincere feelings of friendship. In addition, they offer their services and assistance to their nationalist acquaintances. The most recent example of this phenomenon occurred at the beginning of the Trieste crisis in September 1953.

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8. In addition to this generally known fact of distrust among the leading members of the FCY, there exists what might be called an official distrust of top-level Party and Governmental toward lower executive organs in the country. [] it has been ascertained that all important political and administrative orders issued by the Central Government or the Central Committee of the FCY are simultaneously dispatched to the governmental organization responsible for their implementation, to the Secretary of the FCY for the territorial unit concerned, and to the State Security Office (UDB) for that area.

9. [] it can be said that the desire for quick money and reserve funds is general throughout the Party. Never in the past has there been such an enormous number of cases of embezzlement tried in the courts. []

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[] This is an indication of the shaken faith of the leaders in the cause they advocate.

10. No one can ignore the fact that the FCY, which had only a handful of adherents before the last war and today claims some 800,000 members must be flooded with opportunists whose first thought is to take care of themselves. Mutual distrust is only a normal consequence of such a situation, and fulfillment of official orders is the only available possibility of protection from persecution. The fact that even the leading members of the FCY seek friendship and contact with known anti-communists is normal, but also indicates that fear of the future has shaken the faith of those who should not doubt the rightness of their cause.

11. Purges of Cominformists, which continue to be carried out with zeal, have rather unfavorable effects on the regime, since they prove its vulnerable points and add to the confusion. [] estimates that there are approximately 5,000 Cominformists in jail or other detention institutions.² The resumption of full diplomatic relations with the USSR stimulated rumors among communists and speculation among nationalists that the Kremlin would intervene in the behalf of the imprisoned Cominformists. In late December it was expected that a political amnesty affecting all those Cominformists not qualified to assume leading roles in Yugoslav affairs would take place in the near future.

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12. One development which had a negative effect on the morale of lower-level communists was the attempt by the regime to eliminate the basis for foreign criticism against the Yugoslav rule of terror. The tactics employed for this purpose were the introduction of so-called legal procedure in the administration. Despite the fact that this pressure was only formally relaxed, the population picked up courage and started to act as if the terroristic methods had been abandoned.

13. Summarizing the situation within the FCY, there can be no doubt that the term "general confusion" is the most applicable description. Communist founders of the CPY who passed through a martyrdom of more than twenty years pursuing and propagating communism are barred from any influence in the present regime. People who became communists after they had committed a number of common crimes and war crimes under the excuse of

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fighting the war of liberation, support the Tito regime sincerely. They feel that the regime is the only protection they have, but at the same time realize that their chances to extend the time of escape from punishment for their deeds would be much greater if the regime were backed by the USSR. Tito and his CC realize that their strongest supporters are the crime-compromised members of the Party. It is this group, however, which may presently be the stronghold of the Soviet fifth column within the Party; the old-timers who were discarded by the current Party leadership are its natural allies.

Yugoslav Foreign Relations

14. The Yugoslav regime and the Party consider the Western powers as their number one enemy; it is only a question of time until things are placed in their proper perspective. There is no doubt of the validity of this fact. 25X1

15. Any attempt to present the Cominform rift as a maneuver engineered by the Soviets is baseless.
16. The internal Party situation makes it evident that Tito's freedom of action vis-a-vis the Soviet Orbit is considerably limited. The group of prewar communists who were excluded from Party membership when Tito assumed power, as well as those "old-time" communists who are members of the Party but denied important Party posts, would never support any action against the Orbit, even in the event of an attack.
17. Communists who joined the Party because of their criminal actions during the war or immediately thereafter are more likely to join the "old-time communists" in order to gain the protection of mighty Russia.

- 25X1 18. [redacted] communists have carefully expressed their admiration for Malenkov's wise policy. Based on an analysis of these statements, [redacted] is fairly certain that they imply an expression of hope that changes in the Soviet regime would result in changes in the ruling clique of the USSR which would make possible the resumption of close collaboration between the USSR and Yugoslavia.
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19. The fact that the trip of General Vukmanovic-Tempo to Moscow, which took place prior to Tito's trip to London, was kept so secret in Yugoslavia caused much speculation among anti-communist elements. Communists, however, never mention the trip.³
20. The five years of anti-Cominform propaganda directed against the Satellites has convinced most of the Yugoslav populace that Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria have been reduced to a status of slavery. Moreover, this campaign has intensified the already deep, traditional hatred for the Bulgarians and the Hungarians.

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Internal Situation

21. Based on comparative court records, it can be said that police measures are not equally rigid throughout Yugoslavia. The most strict control is exercised in Bosnia-Herzegovina; the situation is slightly better than this in Serbia; it is still less harsh in Slovenia; and it is the least oppressive in Croatia. For example, so-called political crimes are punished in Bosnia with two years of forced labor, in Serbia with one year of forced labor, and in Croatia with only six months imprisonment.
22. Anti-communist intellectuals in Serbia view Serb communists as communists only, but regard Croatian communists as being Croats first and communists second. Leaders of the FCY in Croatia energetically press for economic advantages for their republic, and they avoid antagonizing the public whenever possible. Ministers of the Croatian Republic visit villages, towns and prisons much more frequently than do their Serb counterparts.
23. It is generally believed in Belgrade that the Croats are the best organized ethnic group in Yugoslavia and that as a result many drastic measures of the regime such as collectivization never hit them as hard as in the other republics. Croatia had the smallest percentage of land under collectives.⁴

Popular Opinion Toward the Present Regime and Its Programs

24. Based on [] observations of life in Serbia, urban workers are not satisfied with their working conditions: high production quotas and their wages. It should be recognized, however, that the majority of the present industrial workers were recruited from among the peasantry following the war and that their previous living standards were very low. This limits their requirements to the bare necessities of life. Consequently, their position has not really worsened. The principal factor contributing to their dissatisfaction is the strict discipline which limits their freedom of action in terms of changing jobs and forces them to work fixed hours under compulsory quotas and overtime. Skilled workers are very dissatisfied because they find themselves in a worse financial situation than they enjoyed before the last war, and they work much harder and longer - approximately sixty hours per week. It is generally known that their wages are barely sufficient to cover the costs of food and rent, while top-level communists live in luxury.
25. Peasants are dissatisfied because the regime imposed relatively high taxes on their lands. Their income is disproportionately low in comparison with the prices of consumer goods. Peasant pride has been deeply injured because local law enforcement is in the hands of those occupying the lowest social status before the war. The majority of these local officials indulged in crimes during and immediately following the war, and an additional wave of brutality was carried out by these same officials during the drives for collectivization. Consequently, the peasants are looking only for the time when they will be in a position to give full expression to their hatred and desire for revenge. If Yugoslavia gets involved in any armed conflict, the peasants will act rapidly to liquidate the local communist officials and representatives of the regime.

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26. Intellectuals, such as engineers, physicians, lawyers and former merchants and industrialists, live far below their prewar standard of life. They have no hope that they can improve their living conditions under the present regime and consider themselves lucky if they earn enough to cover rent and food expenses. They accept this fact as an inevitable evil of the Communist regime. However, their desire to overthrow the regime is motivated mostly by psychological factors, such as humiliation, lack of personal security, and oppressing uncertainty. For example, engineer experts work under the control of young people who have no training in the field; former industrialists work in various factories under the supervision of unskilled workers; physicians are assigned to government hospitals or dispensaries and work under the supervision of young, inexperienced doctors; merchants are happy if they are employed as sales personnel, etc. If they are discharged, they never know what other job they will be permitted to take. The danger that they could be picked up by the UDB continuously hangs over their heads.
27. Youth generally represents a puzzle for both the regime and the anti-communists. The regime had initially gained the sympathy of the youth, but the decision of the government (about two years ago) to cut scholarships of several thousand young people had a very unfavorable reaction because too many of them have not been able to complete their university or advanced studies. Additional dissatisfaction among the young men is being created by the refresher military training courses. Students interrupt their studies or preparations for exams; young workers, especially the married ones, find themselves in an embarrassing financial situation, or their plans to spend their vacation with their family cancelled. However, it should be noted that the regime exerted a great influence on the psychological formation of the youngsters who were 8 to 10 years old in 1944-1945. The great majority of these 18-20 year old young people are staunch supporters of the regime.

Yugoslavia in Case of War

28. Communists are masters of organization. Their test mobilization in the fall of 1953 was very successful. The soldiers appeared to be well-trained and equipped, or at least there cannot be any doubt that they are much better trained and equipped than was the case of the Royal Yugoslav Army in 1941. However, there is a lack of fighting spirit as a result of the general situation in Yugoslavia.
29. The Yugoslav government for years kept convincing the people that it pursues an independent policy and that it was concerned with promoting peace and the economical development of the country. The policy of full neutrality was advocated for years and it was stressed continually that the Yugoslav Army would fight only if the country were attacked.
30. Anti-Communist intellectuals in Belgrade and their Communist friends believe that an attack on Yugoslavia by the Russians would meet no resistance. such a belief was based on the following facts:
- a. The rank and file in the Yugoslav Armed Forces are convinced that any opposition to the Russian Army would be a fruitless bloodshed, since they believe that the Russians could seize Belgrade within 4-5 hours, even without air support;

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- b. Due to the peculiar situation within the Yugoslav Communist Party, Tito and his Government cannot expect the necessary support of the FCY organization;
- c. The big majority of the population actually hates the Russians, but their hatred is based on their anti-communist feelings. They make no distinction between Russian and Tito's Communism. Consequently, they are willing to fight all Communists, including Tito's regime as well;
- d. The anti-communist population excludes the possibility that the Western powers would support Tito, even if he decided to fight the Russians, because they are convinced that the West is aware of the fact that Tito would not exist as an organized power unless efficient military support were given him.

25X1 31. In judging the effect of an attack on Yugoslavia by the bordering Satellite states, [] the population of Yugoslavia was always sympathetic to the Rumanians. Traditional hatred existed in the past between the people of Yugoslavia and Hungaria and Bulgaria. This was intensified during World War II. Official Yugoslav propaganda from 1948 to mid-September 1953 succeeded in convincing the Yugoslav people that Hungary and Bulgaria were reduced to a status of slavery by the Russians and, consequently, would not possess a fighting spirit. In spite of the fact that the premises for talking the people into fighting their traditional enemies exist, there is only a slight possibility the Yugoslav Army could fight an organized battle the Satellites. This is due to the fact that the people of Yugoslavia would first take advantage of the situation in order to satisfy their desire for revenge against domestic Communists by liquidating their present leaders, especially those on the local level.

32. If Turkey or Greece were attacked by the Russians or the Satellites, no action could be expected by Yugoslavia. [] the Yugoslav officials continually endeavored to convince the people that they are under no obligation to defend Greece and Turkey. They explain that the Ankara Pact was signed only for the purpose of setting up a framework for possible relationships and collaboration in case of danger, but that any action or obligation that could possibly arise from the Ankara Pact would be discussed at the time and presented to the National Assembly for approval.

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33. Any request of the Yugoslav Government to the National Assembly for approval to take an active part in defending Greece or Turkey would meet a firm opposition of the old-time communists and communists who are supporters of the regime, because of their fear that any armed conflict in which Yugoslavia took part would be tantamount to their liquidation.

25X1 34. Any attack on Yugoslavia would result in the creation of guerrilla resistance. [] the Yugoslav Government has made necessary preparations for the creation of strong and well-organized guerrilla forces. 25X1 However, [] a retreat to the mountains implies a defeat of organized government forces. The numerical strength of Tito's guerrilla forces will depend on the fact of whether the regime had sufficient time to carry out the mobilization. If Yugoslavia was attacked unexpectedly and the core of Tito's guerrillas were to consist of the retreating units of the standing army, the outlook for strong guerrilla resistance is rather dubious.

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35. Parallel with the creation of the Tito guerrillas, anti-communist guerrilla forces will be established. There is no indication of the existence of any political organization which would handle any preparatory work for the establishment of anti-communist guerrilla forces. However, [] 25X1 that the anti-communist guerrillas will be a result of the circumstances. The people who will be involved in the liquidation of local communists and police personnel will normally seek hideouts in the mountains. Anti-communist soldiers retreating under enemy pressures will take advantage of any opportunity to desert in order to avoid fighting for the regime they hated and will do their best to fight against it. Liquidations of NCOs and officers who expose themselves as ruthless protectors of the regime is very probable.
36. In view of the fact that any occupation force would first seek the destruction of government-led guerrillas, the anti-communist guerrillas will have a fair chance of survival and development. Repetition of the sad experience in World War II - that more than one guerrilla resistance force will be active in Yugoslavia - appears inevitable. [] the 25X1 anti-communist guerrilla group or groups will concentrate their activity against the Tito forces and that most of the guerrilla activity in Yugoslavia will consist of fights between Yugoslav communists and anti-communists.
37. The role of nationalism in the defense of Yugoslavia under communism would be minimal, for nationalist resistance under Tito would be viewed as only perpetuating the power of the present unpopular regime. By liquidating communists at the beginning of any invasion or during the occupation, Yugoslavia would not be faced with any communist problem when the Western powers liberate Yugoslavia.

Yugoslav Policy on Trieste and Importance of Trieste as an Issue in Yugoslavia

38. The Yugoslav regime is aware of the fact that an armed conflict would place it in a dangerous position because the majority of its people are hostile. Based on his awareness, the Government has been struggling since 1948 to keep Yugoslavia out of any serious international conflict in the hope that even in a large-scale war Yugoslavia could remain neutral.
39. The regime was unquestionable aware of the fact that its energetic and provocative stand on the Trieste question in October 1953 would not lead to war, and following communist tactics, they hoped to achieve the following through their bluff:
- a. The salvation of Zone B, claimed by the Italians, and an Allied guarantee that no claim would be made by Italy for this zone.
 - b. To demonstrate to other communist countries the fact that Yugoslavia is totally independent and that the regime did not sell Yugoslavia to the West.
 - c. To appease genuine communists - members of the Party who had lost confidence in the Party's present leaders - to attract them to the PCY.
 - d. To draw the people to the regime by emphasizing the danger from abroad and thus creating the proper conditions for the election in November.

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40. The people in Yugoslavia are not very interested in the Trieste question. Because of the regime's belligerent stand in October 1953 about this question, they received the news of the events with gladness and attended the meetings in the hope that such a Government stand would provoke a war and thus give them an opportunity of becoming free of Tito's regime. The leaders of the PCY have knowledge of this feeling on the part of the majority of the population and they are aware of this danger. During the haranguing of the people on the Trieste question, Dusan Djurdjevic, war partisan, PCY Deputy to the Federal Parliament in Belgrade for the districts of Bayna Bashta and Ljuboviya, at a meeting in Ljubiya, told the audience that the regime is aware of the fact that "reactionaries" are delighted with the conflict in the hope that the conflict will provoke a war which may give the reactionaries the opportunity of liquidating the local communist leaders. He then went on to say that the reactionaries are making a false calculation and they should prepare coffins for themselves because if the Trieste question does provoke a war, the regime will liquidate them before engaging in any fighting. Djurdjevic was re-elected to Parliament in November 1953 for the same districts.

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2. [] Comment: On 29 November 1953 the Government ordered a major amnesty covering 7,194 prisoners. The amnesty decree apparently affected wartime political foes as well as many citizens who had opposed the regime's economic policies, according to the New York Times of 30 November 1953.

3. [] Comment: [] unable to supply any details of Tempo's trip, but stated that it was considered as a fact and not a rumor.

4. [] Comment: [] the percentage of arable land under collectivization at the peak of the collectivization drive stood at approximately 14 per cent in Croatia as compared to only 8 per cent in Slovenia. Figures for the other republics were considerably higher.

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